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Insured drivers who are never in accidents frequently complain
that they will see little, if any, of the money they pay in premiums.
Truly, most people who are insured under all types of policies will pay
a substantially greater amount than they will ever recover. In light of
the common idea that insurance companies are bottomless money pits,
into which insureds eternally pay their hard-earned dollars with no
pay-off, premium-payers find it easy to rationalize abuses of the
institution of insurance. Indeed, little sympathy is felt for the faceless
insurance company when an individual succeeds in getting a piece of
the pie. This mindset, however, is nothing but pervasive self-decep-
tion. On an aggregate level, tolerating such abuses only cheats the
ultimate foundation of the insurance industry: its premium-paying
insureds.
Insurance is our way of dealing with risk, uncertainty, and
factors that are beyond our control.' This observation is especially
evident in the realm of auto accident insurance. A driver can exercise
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extreme caution and care in driving on the roadways and still find
herself the victim of a serious accident for reasons beyond her control,
such as the negligence of other drivers or unforeseeable weather
conditions. Hence, because drivers and other insureds cannot
effectively eliminate the probability of loss, they limit the possible
economic effects of loss at a cost to everyone through insurance,
simultaneously gaining the contentment of peace of mind.
A. The Transactional Costs of Loss Recovery from Insurers
While it is true that most policyholders pay more in insurance
premiums than they will ever recover from an insurer, those who do
recover often recover much more than they will ever pay. Thus, in
this system of risk management, the majority of policyholders subsi-
dizes both the cost of the actual loss incurred by the minority of poli-
cyholders and the transactional costs associated with the minority
recovering that loss. To the extent that either of these costs can be
reduced, the majority will benefit by having to subsidize a reduced
amount of other people's losses, resulting in lower average premiums.
Again, the cost of the actual loss is beyond anyone's control. The
transactional costs, however, such as the cost of recovering subrogated
interests2 amongst insurance companies themselves, are within the
control of insurance companies to some extent, and their efforts to
reduce those transactional costs are worthwhile.
B. A Factual Scenario
As an illustration of the desirability of reducing transactional
costs in insurance, consider the hypothetical case of Ms. Hurt, who is
injured in an automobile collision by Mr. Liable, a tortfeasor insured
2. A subrogated interest refers to an interest created by "an equity called into existence for
the purpose of enabling a party secondarily liable, but who has paid the debt, to reap the benefit
of any securities or remedies which the [tort] creditors may hold against the principal debtor [in
tort] and by the use of which the party paying may thus be made whole." WILLIAM R. VANCE
AND BUIST M. ANDERSON, HANDBOOK ON THE LAW OF INSURANCE § 134 at 787 (1951)
(quoting St. Louis, I.M. & S. Ry. Co. v. Commercial Union Ins. Co., 139 U.S. 223 (1891)). The
right of subrogation exists, then, when a party, the subrogee, pays another's obligation for which
it has no primary liability, and this right of subrogation protects the subrogee's own rights and
interests. Millers Cas. Ins. Co. v. Briggs, 100 Wash. 2d 9, 13-14, 665 P.2d 887, 890 (1983).
When an insurer has a subrogation interest, for purposes of a claim involving that interest it has
the same rights as the insured injured party. Touchet Valley Grain Growers, Inc. v. Opp & Sei-
bold Gen. Constr. Inc., 119 Wash. 2d 334, 341, 831 P.2d 724, 728 (1992). Thus, when an
insurer pays its insured who has become injured in some way, the insurer, through a subrogation
clause in its policy with the insured, has a subrogation right with respect to the amount it has




under an auto liability policy.3 As a result of the accident, Ms. Hurt
incurs significant medical expenses that require immediate payment,
and she is able to pay for those expenses through her own Personal
Injury Protection (PIP) insurance policy4 with ABC Insurance Com-
pany. A portion of Ms. Hurt's PIP policy reads as follows:
d. If the insured recovers from the party at fault and we share in
the recovery, we will pay our share of the legal expenses. Our
share is that percent of the legal expenses that the amount we
recover bears to the total recovery.
This does not apply to any amounts recovered or recover-
able by us from any other insurer under any interinsurer arbi-
tration agreement.
The PIP policy will cover Ms. Hurt's medical expenses and tem-
porarily compensate her for any loss in wages if she is forced to stop
working, but it will not compensate her for any pain and suffering she
experiences. Therefore, Ms. Hurt hires her own attorney, who will be
compensated by way of a contingent fee agreement under which he is
paid one third of the entire recovery. Ms. Hurt hopes to recover gen-
eral damages6 from Mr. Liable under his liability insurance policy
with XYZ Insurance Company, which is a signatory to an interinsurer
arbitration agreement with ABC.
Ms. Hurt's attorney notifies ABC Insurance that he is repre-
senting Ms. Hurt and acknowledges that ABC has a right to be reim-
bursed for the PIP payments it has made. However, ABC responds
that it intends to recover those payments through the interinsurer
3. This hypothetical parallels the facts of Mahler v. Szucs, 135 Wash. 2d 398, 957 P.2d 632
(1998).
4. Personal Injury Protection (PIP) is first-party insurance, meaning that it pays benefits to
the insured herself when she becomes injured. See ROBERT H. JOOST, AUTOMOBILE
INSURANCE AND NO-FAULT LAW 2D § 2:3 (1992). PIP coverage should be distinguished from
liability coverage, which is third-party coverage, meaning that it compensates some person other
than the insured for damages caused by the insured. See id. § 2:5. In 1987, twenty-nine percent
of the automobile injury claims in the United States that were paid from automobile insurance
sources were paid under PIP coverage, whereas forty-seven percent were paid under liability cov-
erage. See id. § 2:2 (citing All-Industry Research Advisory Council (AIRAC), Compensation for
Automobile Injuries in the United States 6 (1989)).
5. This exclusionary policy language is identical to that in the policy held by the plaintiffs
in Mahler, 135 Wash. 2d at 419, 957 P.2d at 643.
6. General damages have been distinguished from special damages on the ground that they
need not be claimed or mentioned in the complaint in order to be the subject of proof and recov-
ery at the trial. This distinction is based on the proposition that general damages necessarily
flow from the breach of duty of care, whereas special damages are specific proximate results that
do not flow as a matter of necessity from the breach. See generally CHARLES T. MCCORMICK,
DAMAGES, § 8 (1935). In this case, general damages refers to compensation for pain and suffer-
ing and long-term loss in income resulting from permanent disability caused by the defendant's
negligence, which necessarily flow from the liable party's negligent operation of an automobile.
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arbitration agreement between it and XYZ, which is referenced in the
policy above. ABC thus advises Ms. Hurt's attorney to do nothing to
recover its PIP payment interest. Ms. Hurt's attorney litigates with
XYZ and reaches a settlement. However, because Ms. Hurt's attorney
has had to document Ms. Hurt's medical expenses in order to prove
the existence of her pain and suffering, the settlement he arranges con-
sists of both the medical expenses that have already been paid for by
ABC and Ms. Hurt's general damages for pain and suffering. Given
the clause noted in the PIP policy held by Ms. Hurt with ABC, should
ABC Insurance Company have to pay part of Ms. Hurt's attorney fees
in this situation? In Mahler v. Szuchs, the Washington Supreme
Court recently decided that it must.
7
This Note will demonstrate that the Mahler court's decision will
lead to inefficient results, because it has essentially compelled PIP
insurers to accept representation by attorneys who have a conflict of
interests, precluding such insurers from selecting the best means of
recovering their PIP interests. As a result, the price of insurance pre-
miums inevitably will escalate, while providing plaintiffs' attorneys
with a windfall of increased fees for performing no additional work for
their clients. The following discussion will show not only that the
Mahler court holding is inefficient as a matter of public policy, but
also that its analysis ignores a body of Washington case law that sug-
gests the opposite conclusion should have been reached as a matter of
legal precedent.
The remainder of this section discusses the specific facts of the
two cases that comprise Mahler in its consolidated form. Section II
discusses fundamental principles of insurance law and economic effi-
ciency and the manner in which the Washington courts have adopted
these principles. Finally, Section III contrasts the implications of
Mahler with these principles and with Washington precedent to show
that the decision is both inefficient and contrary to the rationales of
prior case law.
C. The Facts of the Consolidated Cases of Mahler v. Szuchs
and Fisher v. Aldi Tire, Inc.
The Washington Supreme Court recently decided that an insurer
must pay reasonable attorney's fees when an insured recovers its PIP
interest in a situation like Ms. Hurt's.8 In essence, the court created
an entitlement in plaintiffs' attorneys to collect a portion of a PIP
insurer's payment interest when they recover such an interest pursuant




to a settlement with the liability insurer. The respective plaintiffs,
Mahler and Fisher, similar to Ms. Hurt in the above scenario, recov-
ered amounts from liability insurers that they had to hand over to their
PIP insurer, which happened to be State Farm Insurance Company in
both cases. The language in the State Farm PIP insurance policies
held by both Ms. Mahler and Ms. Fisher was identical to that in the
scenario above,9 clearly indicating that in the event that it could
recover such interests via interinsurer arbitration, it would not have to
pay attorney's fees for recovering those interests.
In the first of Mahler's two consolidated cases, Dr. George Szucs
injured Elaine Mahler in an automobile collision."0 Ms. Mahler hired
her own attorney to seek general damages, similar to Ms. Hurt in the
example above.1' After her attorney notified State Farm that he was
representing her, State Farm responded that he should "take no action
whatsoever in connection with the recovery of State Farm's claim
against the adverse party or insurance company.' '12  However,
Mahler's attorney ignored this instruction, electing to collect State
Farm's PIP interest along with general damages. Nevertheless, he
demanded that State Farm owed him for recovering that interest.' 3 In
response, State Farm declared that it would "not accept having [the
attorney's] services unilaterally forced upon [it] for a fee that [it had]
not agreed to."' 4
Mahler's attorney retained the recovered PIP payments in his
trust account and filed a series of motions seeking a declaration that
State Farm owed him an attorney's fee credit against that amount. 5
Finally, after a mandatory hearing, an arbitrator awarded Mahler's
attorney the credit against the PIP payment funds in his trust
account.' 6 State Farm was then granted a trial de novo, and on cross-
motions for summary judgment in superior court, Mahler's attorney
was awarded a similar offset for recovering State Farm's PIP payment
interest.17 The court entered no findings of fact or conclusions of law
to support the award. 8  Mahler and State Farm then sought direct
9. Id. at 419. 957 P.2d at 643.
10. Id. at 405, 957 P.2d at 637.
11. Id. at 406, 957 P.2d at 637.
12. Id.
13. Mahler, 135 Wash. 2d at 407, 957 P.2d at 637.
14. Id. (quoting State Farm's letter to Mahler's attorney).
15. Id. at 407, 957 P.2d at 638. The recovered PIP payments amounted to $4,173.32. The
attorney's fee credit claimed against those PIP funds amounted to $1,391.10.
16. Id.
17. Id. at 407-08, 957 P.2d at 638.
18. The Superior Court awarded Mahler $1,612.59 as an offset. Id.
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review to the Washington Supreme Court, and the case was consoli-
dated with Fisher's.19
Fisher's case involved a truck insured under a liability policy
held by Aldi Tire, Inc., which injured Monica Fisher in an automobile
collision.2' Fisher likewise hired her own attorney to obtain general
damages, but neither Fisher nor her attorney notified State Farm that
Fisher intended to litigate State Farm's PIP interest until Fisher's
attorney had nearly reached a settlement with Aldi Tire's insurer,
Federated Service Insurance Company. 21 At that time, Fisher's attor-
ney likewise demanded that State Farm pay him for recovering its PIP
payment interest. 22 Again, State Farm refused to pay fees for services
to which it had never agreed.23
Upon settlement with the liability insurer, Fisher requested and
the court ordered that the amount of State Farm's PIP interest be
placed in the registry of the court so that the settlement agreementcould otherwise be executed. 24 Fisher then instituted a complaint in
interpleader to decide the issue of attorney's fees, and, on cross-
motions for summary judgment, the court ruled that the entire
amount would be disbursed to State Farm without any payment to
Fisher. 25  Fisher appealed and the Court of Appeals reversed and
remanded for a factual inquiry as to whether the PIP payment interest
was actually "recoverable" under State Farm's exclusion clause.26 On
remand, the trial court granted State Farm's summary judgment
motion, holding that the PIP payments were "recoverable" under the
exclusion but for the interference of Fisher's attorney.27 Fisher and
19. Id. at 408, 957 P.2d at 638.
20. Id.
21. The court indicates that "[s]ix months before Fisher filed a complaint against the tort-
feasor, State Farm wrote her a letter, with a copy to her attorney, saying, 'If you should recover
our [First Party Benefit payments] from the responsible party or their [sic] insurance carrier, you
must protect our reimbursement rights,"' noting that Fisher's attorney then "exerted significant
efforts to establish liability." Id. at 408-09, 957 P.2d at 638. However, note that not until "[tiwo
years later, with the case set for trial, [did] Fisher's attorney [inform] State Farm that after doing
everything 'but hammer at the gates of hell,' he was close to settlement" of both general and spe-
cial damages. Id. at 408-09, 957 P.2d at 638-39. Thus, Fisher's attorney demanded attorney's
fees without having provided any kind of notice to State Farm that he intended to recover its
interest. The letter from State Farm merely warned that if its interests were recovered by Fisher,
its reimbursement rights must be protected. The letter was not a solicitation by State Farm for
Fisher's attorney to actually collect that interest. Id. at 407, 957 P.2d at 637.
22. Id. at 409, 957 P.2d at 639.
23. Id.
24. Id. at 410, 957 P.2d at 639.
25. Id.
26. Id. The Court of Appeals concluded that whether the PIP payments were actually
"recoverable" through the process provided in the arbitration agreement was an issue of fact to
be determined by the trial court. Id.
27. Id. at 411, 957 P.2d at 639.
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State Farm likewise sought and were granted direct review to the
Washington Supreme Court.m"
II. PRINCIPLES OF INSURANCE AND THE LAW OF WASHINGTON
A. Involvement of Attorneys in Loss Recovery and
Increased Transaction Costs
Attorneys' fees account for a significant portion of the transac-
tional costs involved in loss recovery. A 1987 study conducted by the
All Industry Research Advisory Council (now known as the Insurance
Research Council) and a 1988 study conducted by the National Asso-
ciation of Insurance Commissioners (NAIC) revealed significantly
higher premiums in states where a greater number of personal injury
claimants were represented by attorneys. 9 This empirical study com-
ports with the theoretical notion that where attorneys are involved in
recovering an insured's interest, the costs of recovery will be higher
because of the increased transactional costs that attorneys necessitate.
Of course, whether an insured will exercise her right to counsel is
a matter beyond anyone's control but the insured herself, and rightly
so. The limitation of attorney participation in loss recovery can only
be imposed when, as in Mahler, both parties are insurers who have
agreed contractually, through an arbitration agreement, to resolve
their disputes without resort to the judicial system. Such an arbitra-
tion agreement is practical and sensible, given the frequency with
which insurers have routine claims against one another. Thus, inter-
insurer arbitration clauses are an effective effort to reduce transac-
tional costs when two insurers have a dispute that can be resolved
without the active involvement of their insureds.
As a final comment on economic efficiency, consider the impor-
tance of free choice in determining the most efficient course of action
for a corporation, such as an insurance company. As the following
discussion reveals, insurers find themselves with various interests and
a range of methods for pursuing those interests. Because an insurer is
the best judge of its own costs and seeks to minimize those costs, it
will seek to determine, often by trial and error, which method or plan
of pursuing its interests is the least costly to utilize. The insurer may
even determine that not pursuing an interest is the most cost-efficient
choice if its resources are better utilized in some other fashion. To
foster economic efficiency, the government or the courts should
28. Id.
29. See ROBERT H. JOOST, AUTOMOBILE INSURANCE AND NO FAULT LAW 2D § 10:16
(1992).
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impose limits on the insurer's choices only when some vital public
policy justifies such a restriction.
B. Personal Injury Protection (PIP) Policies and
Their Enforcement Mechanisms
The various means by which an insurer can enforce its interests
under a PIP policy dominate the Mahler court's decision, and the
question of the validity of these means of enforcement is the linchpin
of its opinion. Thus, a basic understanding of these various means, or
enforcement mechanisms, is essential to an understanding of the
Mahler opinion.
PIP insurance coverage is "no fault," meaning that an insured
under a PIP policy is entitled to payments when she is injured, regard-
less of whether she was at fault for the damages or injuries she sus-
tained." When an insurer makes payments for medical and other
expenses under a PIP policy, it has a subrogation or reimbursement
interest in those payments. 1 This interest entitles the insurer to be
reimbursed for its payments in the event that its insured recovers the
payments as part of a settlement or judgment, or, alternatively, to
"step into the shoes of the insured" and actively recover its interest. 2
Thus, when an insurer exercises its interest to be reimbursed, it is
passive, whereas when it exercises its interest to be subrogated, it is
actively involved in the litigation process. Traditionally, then, as the
court in Mahler states, the insurer has only one interest, but it has two
possible mechanisms for enforcing that interest.33
However, as insurance companies have sought to adapt to the
growing demands of their insureds in a more litigation-prone legal
environment, and as arbitration has experienced increased popularity
as an alternative to in-court adjudication, a third enforcement mecha-
nism, contractual in nature, has become available to insurers: the
interinsurer arbitration agreement. This mechanism falls somewhere
between the first two in terms of the degree to which the insurer is an
active litigant. When insurers are signatories to an interinsurer arbi-
tration agreement, they agree that when one of the signatories is a PIP
insurer of an injured insured and another is the liability insurer of the
corresponding tortfeasor, the PIP insurer may invoke intercompany
30. 9 GEORGE G. COUCH, ET AL., COUCH ON INSURANCE § 125:2 (3d ed. 1999) [herein-
after COUCH ON INSURANCE].
31. The Mahler court discusses subrogation principles in its opinion. See Mahler, 135
Wash. 2d at 412-13, 957 P.2d at 640-41. See also 73 AM. JUR. 2D, Subrogation, § 26 (1974).
This Note refers to this interest generally as the insurer's PIP interest.
32. See Mahler, 135 Wash. 2d at 412-13, 957 P.2d at 640-41.
33. Id. at 412, 957 P.2d at 640.
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arbitration to settle the dispute for a quick recovery of its PIP interest
without resort to in-court adjudication.34 Thus, when the insurer par-
ticipates in intercompany arbitration, it is active to the extent of its
own interest, but it does not "step into the shoes" of its insured. This
device allows efficient out-of-court settlement of the insurers' interests
and liabilities without prejudicing the interests of the insured. Some
states even require disputed arbitration claims to be resolved through
interinsurer arbitration35 because of its convenience and efficiency.36
C. Recovery of Damages in Personal Injury Lawsuits
In addition to these basic concepts, certain predicaments arise in
the particular context of personal injury lawsuits that further elucidate
the significance of the Mahler decision.37 First, consider the relation-
ship between insurer and insured in property loss cases, in which the
parties experience no conflict in pursuit of their respective interests.
This mutuality exists because, when loss is limited to an item of prop-
erty that has an ascertainable value, the subrogation or reimbursement
interest of the insurer does not surpass the value of that lost property.
Therefore, the interests of insurer and insured are aligned in this con-
text and most others. In such cases, so long as the insured's loss does
not exceed the coverage limits of her property loss policy, she has no
reason to litigate with the tortfeasor, because she has already been
compensated. The insurer can exercise complete discretion as to
whether and how it will enforce its subrogation interest, and, as a
profit-seeking entity, it has every incentive to employ the most
efficient methods of enforcement.
34. See ARBITRATION FORUMS, INC., PERSONAL INJURY PROTECTION (NO-FAULT)
ARBITRATION AGREEMENT, 1/96 PIP (1991) (standardized form).
35. See, e.g., COL. REV. STAT. § 10-4-717 (Supp. 1998); D.C. CODE § 35-2111 (1981);
N.J. STAT. § 39.6A-11 (1990).
36. As State Farm stated in its appellate brief,
In particular, enforcement of agreements between insurers requiring arbitration of
subrogation claims is supported by public policy. First, these agreements remove
thousands of small claims from the court system, freeing up judicial resources for
other claims. Second, inter-insurer arbitration permits insurers to resolve subrogation
claims in a manner which is far less costly and time consuming than litigation....
Third, these arbitration agreements free first party claimants and tortfeasors from the
necessity of participating in litigation of subrogation claims. It is no longer necessary
for the subrogated insurer to sue the tortfeasor in the name of its insured. Instead, the
subrogee arbitrates directly against the tortfeasor's insurer, without any involvement
of the individuals involved in the accident.
Brief of Respondent at 36-37, Mahler v. Szucs, 135 Wash. 2d 398, 957 P.2d 632 (1998) (No.
65014-4).
37. The Mahler court recognizes some, though not all, of these issues. See Mahler, 135
Wash. 2d at 413-15, 957 P.2d at 641-42.
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In contrast, in actions for personal injury, a plaintiff typically
recovers both special damages, or out-of-pocket medical and other
expenses, and general damages, or noneconomic damages for pain and
suffering, in a single claim.3" PIP payments, like those paid by State
Farm to Mahler and Fisher, fall exclusively into the category of special
damages, because they cover only the costs of the insured's medical
care and wage loss.3"
Furthermore, general damages have a dependent relationship to
special damages; the greater the medical expenses and other special
damages, the greater the amount of general damages a plaintiff will
typically recover."g This dependent relationship is based on the com-
mon-sense notion that the more medical treatment necessary to reha-
bilitate an injured person, the more pain and suffering that person
likely experienced. 4' As the Mahler court recognizes,
It is a well known fact that the dollar amount of medical
expenses has a direct influence on the amount of general dam-
ages that will be awarded by a court or jury and it is for that
reason that attorneys desire to prove the amount of such
expenses. The amount of lost earnings also has an important
impact as it tends to demonstrate the period of physical disabil-
ity.42
Again, PIP insurance policies cover only special damages, spe-
cifically, medical expenses and wage loss. Therefore, if an injured per-
son wishes to obtain compensation for pain and suffering, she must
initiate a suit or threaten to initiate a suit against the tortfeasor him-
self, usually intending to reach funds available from the tortfeasor's
liability insurance policy.
Whether the injured plaintiff recovers in court or through a set-
tlement agreement with the liability insurer, she will have to prove her
injury and the effect it has had on her before damages will be awarded.
The plaintiff must provide proof of both special and general damages,
38. "[T]he injured insured will often sue the tortfeasor to recover noneconomic damages,
and include in the claim the medical expenses he or she has incurred as a result of the injury."
Mahler, 135 Wash. 2d at 414, 957 P.2d at 641.
39. See 12 COUCH ON INSURANCE, supra note 30, § 171:30 (3d ed. 1999) (stating that
"[G]eneral damages have never been intended as a substitute for PIP benefits.")
40. "[I]n a personal injury case, the claimed noneconomic damages typically amount to
many multiples of the economic damages and are almost always disputed because they are not
objectively ascertainable." Mahler, 135 Wash. 2d at 414, 957 P.2d at 641.
41. "Trauma or disease excite peripheral nerves, along whose pathways run the message of
pain. This basic physiological concept supports the principle that the traditional claim for pain
and suffering usually accompanies impact or physical injury." 23 AM. JUR. PROOF OF FACTS
2D Pain and Suffering § 1 (1980).
42. Mahler, 135 Wash. 2d at 426, 957 P.2d at 647.
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although, as the Mahler court implied above, the two often call for the
same type of proof.
In validating expenses for medical treatment after an injury, an
insurance claims adjuster, or a court for that matter, considers the
duration of the treatment, the extent to which it was necessary, and
above all, documentation and verification of the treatment. 43 Like-
wise, when evaluating the validity of general damages, an insurer or a
court weighs the intensity and duration of the injury, as well as the
community reaction or public perception of how taxing the injury is. 44
Note that an essential element of proving the validity of both special
and general damages is verification of the injury itself. The duration
of an injury cannot be shown without evidence that treatment was
actually provided for a given period, such as by providing copies of
bills from physicians or medical care providers. To appropriately
show an injury's intensity, opinions from the treating physicians as
expressed in chart notes and narrative reports would be necessary.
Thus, because of the dependent relationship expressed above and the
necessity of verification, plaintiffs' attorneys must, in any case, docu-
ment special damages resulting from an injury to recover any general
damages, which typically constitute the bulk of the total damages
recovery.
Having reflected on the predominance of general damages in
typical personal injury recoveries, consider the motivation of an
injured plaintiff who is insured under a PIP policy for seeking legal
representation in the first place. Because the insured plaintiff has
largely been compensated for her actual out-of-pocket expenses, or
special damages, typically she seeks an attorney's assistance not to
recover those special damages but to recover general damages for her
associated pain and suffering. Mahler and Fisher, in securing repre-
sentation, surely intended to recover general damages; they did not
mean to ensure altruistically that their insurer was reimbursed for the
PIP payments it had made to remedy their losses. Given the client's
motivation and the attorney's obligation to serve the interests of her
client,45 recovery of special damages is clearly not a legitimate goal of
43. These criteria were taken from materials provided at a Continuing Legal Education
Seminar sponsored by the Washington State Trial Lawyers Association by a legal examiner in
the litigation unit at Pemco Insurance Co. See Scott Tucker, Evaluation of Personal Injury Cases
- an Overview, In Evaluating a P.I. Case from the Adjuster's Point of View, WASHINGTON STATE
TRIAL LAWYERS ASSOCIATION SEMINAR MATERIALS, at 37 (Sept. 23, 1994).
44. See id.
45. The Washington Rules of Professional Conduct Rule 1.2(a) defines the scope of an
attorney's representation of a client, providing that "[a] lawyer shall abide by a client's decisions
concerning the objectives of representation ... and shall consult with the client as to the means
by which they are to be pursued." WASHINGTON RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule
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the personal injury attorney. Hence, the fact that special damages are
established when a personal injury attorney proves that her client has
suffered general damages is incidental to the attorney's primary pur-
pose of obtaining general damages. Consequently, unsolicited work
by an attorney to recover these interests, which are no longer a concern
of the insured client, clearly exceeds the scope of the attorney's repre-
sentation.
D. Legal Precedent
1. The Supreme Court of Washington: A Trilogy of Cases
Synthesizing a legal framework into the special issues that arise in
personal injury lawsuits and the modern economic concerns of the
insurance industry, the Washington Supreme Court has defined the
rights and duties of insurers and insureds in a trilogy of cases over the
past several decades.46 The principles announced in these three cases
and in cases handed down by the court of appeals contradict the
holding of Mahler.
In Metropolitan Life Insurance Co. v. Ritz, the court laid down a
duty on the part of an insured not to prejudice an insurer's reimburse-
ment or subrogation interest.47  There, the plaintiff insurance
company had paid the defendant insured for medical expenses arising
out of an automobile accident pursuant to a group policy that covered
"medical expenses."48  The insured, to receive this compensation,
signed a reimbursement agreement, promising to reimburse Metro-
politan Life "to the extent of any recovery of said expenses as the
result of legal action or settlement .... "" However, the insured then
negotiated with the tortfeasor without notifying Metropolitan Life,
signing a "Release in Full of All Claims," in which the insured
released the tortfeasor from all claims or potential claims arising out of
the accident. 5° The trial court found, however, that by signing a
1.2(a) (1990). Considering that a client who is insured under a PIP policy is already compen-
sated for medical expenses, it is unlikely that recovering these medical expenses from the tort-
feasor would be one of the "objectives of representation" of such a client.
46. See Leader Nat'l Ins. Co. v. Torres, 113 Wash. 2d 366, 779 P.2d 722 (1989); Thiringer
v. American Motors Ins. Co., 91 Wash. 2d 215, 588 P.2d 191 (1978); Metropolitan Life Ins. Co.
v. Ritz, 70 Wash. 2d 317, 422 P.2d 780 (1967).
47. See Metropolitan Life, 70 Wash. 2d 317, 422 P.2d 780.
48. Id. at 318, 422 P.2d at 781.
49. Id. at 318-19,422 P.2d at 781.
50. The agreement stated:
For and in consideration of the payment to me/us at this time of the sum of Seven
thousand and no/100 Dollars ($7000.00), the receipt of which is hereby acknowl-
edged, I/we, being of lawful age, do hereby release, acquit and forever discharge [the
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complete release without the insurer's consent, the insured had
"extinguished [the insurer's] right of subrogation, '"' unduly prejudic-
ing the insurer's interest and depriving it of its rights.5 2 Thus, the
court stressed the importance of the need for the insurer's consent
whenever an insured enters into a settlement agreement involving the
insurer's PIP interest.
53
In light of this prejudice, the court held that a PIP insurer can
recover its interest directly from the insured when the insured, as part
of such a settlement agreement with the tortfeasor's liability insurer,
signs a release of claims for medical expenses without the knowledge
of the PIP insurer.5 4 Thus, in Metropolitan Life, the court considered
the insurer's knowledge and consent to a settlement agreement that
might adversely affect its ability to recover its interest to be of para-
mount concern in its decision.
Significantly, the court in Metropolitan Life also rejected the
argument made by the defendant insureds that they did not intend to
settle "medical expenses," and that the settlement agreement executed
with the tortfeasor represented compensation only for general damages
and wage loss. 5 Thus, Metropolitan Life reflects the necessity for
characterization of settlement recoveries to the extent that they com-
pensate an insured for either general or special damages. While the
court does not expressly state this necessity, this case demonstrates the
prejudice to the parties' interests that can otherwise result from ambi-
guity over whether a settlement denotes compensation for general
damages or medical expenses. Furthermore, despite any specific
espousal by the court for characterization of damages recovered pursu-
ant to a settlement agreement, this solution seems the obvious remedy
to the undesirable effects of settlement ambiguity apparent in Metro-
politan Life.
Next, in Thiringer v. American Motors Ins. Co., the court estab-
lished that an insured must be fully compensated before an insurer can
recover its PIP payments or, as in the Thiringer case itself, before an
tortfeasor] of and from any and all actions, causes of action, claims, demands, dam-
ages, costs, loss of services, expenses and compensation on account of, or in any way
growing out of, any and all known and unknown personal injuries and property dam-
age resulting or to result from accident that occurred on or about the 27th day of
November, 1960, at or near U.S. Highway #30, near Cascade Locks, Oregon.
Id. at 319, 422 P.2d at 781-82.
51. Id. at 320, 422 P.2d at 782.
52. Id.
53. The court notes that "(t]his settlement was arranged without the assistance or advice of
the plaintiff insurance company." Id. at 319, 422 P.2d at 781-82.
54. Id. at 321, 422 P.2d at 783.
55. Id.
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insurer can refuse to make PIP payments subsequent to an insuffi-
ciently small settlement. 6 According to the court,
The general rule is that, while an insurer is entitled to be reim-
bursed to the extent that its insured recovers payment for the
same loss from a tort-feasor responsible for the damage, it can
recover only the excess remaining after the insured is fully com-
pensated for his loss by the wrongdoer.57
By this statement, the court invoked the so-called "make whole"
doctrine,8 which, serves to protect insureds by ensuring that they are
fully compensated by a settlement. While this rule appears to be a
rational approach to fair allocation of settlement recoveries, without
any guidance to its proper application it evokes a barrage of uncer-
tainties. 9 Chiefly, the rule fails to prescribe when an insured is fully
compensated and who must bear the burden of proving this fact.
Again, requiring an insured to characterize the recoveries in a settle-
ment resolves these uncertainties most easily. As a party to the
agreement, the insured plaintiff knows the basis for the recovery and
can more easily identify that basis than an insurer can by speculation.
Hence, Thiringer reinforces the characterization principle evident in
the court's decision in Metropolitan Life-it implicitly requires char-
acterization of recovery in a settlement between an injured person cov-
ered by a PIP policy and a liability insurer. When an injured person
settles with a liability insurer for an amount partially for special dam-
ages and partially for general damages, that injured person must
implicitly consent to the recovery being allocated as the settlement
agreement characterizes it.
Thiringer also demonstrates that plaintiffs' attorneys can feasibly
document special damages without claiming them as part of a settle-
ment. In Thiringer, the plaintiffs attorney documented special dam-
ages in order to recover general damages from the tortfeasor and his
insurer to the extent that either the tortfeasor's assets or his insurance
coverage could pay for them. In turn, the PIP insurer had to pay PIP
benefits, even though there was no chance that it would ever be reim-
bursed, because the insured's medical expenses exceeded both the
tortfeasor's assets and his insurance coverage.6" Therefore, the docu-
56. Thiringer v. American Motors Ins. Co., 91 Wash. 2d 215, 219, 588 P.2d 191, 193
(1978).
57. Id.
58. For a discussion of the "make whole" doctrine, see Roger M. Baron, Subrogation: A
Pandora's Box Awaiting Closure, 41 S.D.L. Rev. 237,249-51 (1996).
59. See Baron, supra note 58, at 251.
60. Thiringer, 91 Wash. 2d at 217, 588 P.2d at 192. The insured accepted a $15,000 set-
tlement, which was the limit of the tortfeasor's liability insurance policy, and the tortfeasor had
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mentation of special damages was merely an evidentiary necessity in
obtaining general damages, and the plaintiffs attorney received no
portion of special damages for that documentation. Instead, he was
compensated exclusively by a percentage of the general damages
agreed to in a contingent fee agreement with his client, the insured
plaintiff.
Finally, in the most recent of the Washington Supreme Court's
trilogy of decisions, Leader National Insurance Co. v. Torres, the court
protected the interests of PIP insurers from tortfeasors and their liabil-
ity insurers directly.6' There, an insured received medical expense
payments under a PIP policy with his insurer, Leader National, settled
with the tortfeasors, and signed an agreement that was approved by
the trial court, which released the tortfeasors, their insurer, and their
attorney from "any and all claims."62  The Washington Supreme
Court held that a PIP insurer has a right of action against a liability
insurer when, aware that the PIP insurer has a reimbursement interest,
the liability insurer settles with an insured, and requires the insured to
sign a general release without the PIP insurer's knowledge.63 Thus,
this decision effectively established a liability insurer's duty to ascer-
tain that a PIP insured is notified of and consents to any settlement
agreement with one of its insureds that affects its reimbursement
interest, again emphasizing the necessity of the PIP insurer's consent
to any settlement that will dispose of or prejudice its rights.64 There-
fore, whereas Thiriniger requires the insured to preserve the PIP
insurer's reimbursement interest, Leader National requires the same of
a liability insurer.
Each of these related decisions, while addressing issues slightly
different from the one presented in Mahler, hinges on the insurer's
consent and the degree to which a settlement would infringe on its
rights to pursue its reimbursement or subrogation interest in whatever
fashion it deems most beneficial. They thereby uphold the free choice
principle discussed in Section II.
no other reachable assets. Id. Because the tortfeasor's assets had been totally extinguished, the
insurer, the court reasoned, could not have been prejudiced by the settlement agreement, and
therefore it could not deny recovery on the policy. Id. at 218, 588 P.2d at 193.
61. Leader Nat'l, 113 Wash. 2d at 373-74, 779 P.2d at 726.
62. Id. at 368, 779 P.2d at 723.
63. Id. at 373-74, 779 P.2d at 726. The Washington Supreme Court held that "a release
between an insured and a torifeasor does not extinguish the insurer's subrogation rights if (1) the
tortfeasor knows of the insurer's payment and right of subrogation, (2) the insurer does not con-
sent to the settlement, and (3) the settlement does not exhaust the tortfeasor's assets." Id.
64. See id. (holding that when the PIP insurer "does not consent to the settlement" reached
by the tortfeasor and the liability insurer, it can recover its subrogation interest directly from the
liability insurer).
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2. The Washington Court of Appeals: Overlooked Decisions
Applying the same line of reasoning, Division III of the Wash-
ington Court of Appeals has heard at least two cases that are factually
almost identical to the cases consolidated in Mahler.65 In Pena v.
Thorington, the court denied a claim for attorney's fees when the
insurer had actively pursued recovery of its subrogated interest with
the liability insurer.66 The court held that "[i]f the insurer decides to
pursue its subrogation claim on its own, it should have the right to do
so.' In Pena, the court preserved the insurer's right to arrange for
payment of its subrogation interest directly from the defendant's
insurer. Like the court in Mahler, the Pena court focused on the
benefit to the insured in determining whether or not attorney's fees
should be shared. It made this determination based on "[w]hether the
services of [the plaintiffs] attorney were necessary under the circum-
stances . ".."68 Hence, because another means of collecting the
insurer's subrogation interest was available, the court refused to award
attorney's fees.69
Taking the Pena court's rationale and extending it to the facts of
Mahler, the Mahler court should logically have denied attorney's fees.
Like the insurer in Pena, State Farm preferred to pursue its PIP inter-
est via a completely viable, although different, means than its
insured-intercompany arbitration. While State Farm had not
actually litigated its PIP interest, as the plaintiff insurer in Pena did, it
unambiguously expressed its intention to do so in its letter to Mahler's
attorney.70 In Fisher's case, State Farm was given insufficient notice
of Fisher's independent representation to make a decision.7
Finally, in Richter, Wimberly & Ericson v. Honore, the court
denied the recovery of attorney's fees, enforcing policy language which
read, almost identical to that of the policy in Mahler, "This provision
shall not apply as to such amounts recovered or recoverable by the
Company from another insurer pursuant to the Inter-company
Arbitration Agreements .... ""
Again, in this decision, the court honored the right of the insurer
to pursue its interests in the manner of its choice, giving full force to a
65. See, e.g., Richter, Wimberly & Ericson v. Honore, 29 Wash. App. 507, 628 P.2d 1311
(1980); Pena v. Thorington, 23 Wash. App. 277, 595 P.2d 61 (1979).
66. 23 Wash. App. at 282, 595 P.2d at 64.
67. Id.
68. Id. at 281-82, 595 P.2d at 64.
69. Id.
70. See Mahler v. Szucs, 135 Wash. 2d 398, 406, 957 P.2d 632, 637 (1998).
71. See id. at 408, 957 P.2d at 638.
72. 29 Wash. App. at 508, 638 P.2d at 1312 n.1.
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nearly identical interinsurer arbitration clause. Along the same lines
of reasoning, other states' courts have also held that an insured cannot
recover a share of legal expenses from the insurer when it settles the
insurer's subrogation claim, unless it gives prior notice to and obtains
consent from the insurer.73
Admittedly, the Mahler court was not bound by either Pena or
Richter, since both were handed down by lower courts. However, the
Mahler court fails even to mention them in its analysis, much less to
explain why it holds that their analyses are incorrect or why it has cho-
sen to turn the public policy of several decades on its head.
E. Possible Policies Behind the Mahler Court's Decision
Recall that in Mahler, the court held that when a plaintiff has
received payments from her PIP insurer and subsequently hires an
independent attorney to litigate damages, the insurer is required to
pay reasonable attorney's fees if the insured's attorney recovers its PIP
interest from the liability insurer. The court imposes this duty on the
insurer even when the insured's attorney collects the insurer's interest
against its express will. 4 As the following discussion will reveal, the
Mahler court fails in its attempt to justify its holding with a strict
reading of the policy language.
However, the reasons that may have motivated the court in
reaching its decision are not inconceivable. An insurance policy is a
contract, and the courts have consistently held that an insurance policy
should be interpreted as such.7" On the other hand, because of the
unequal bargaining power between insurers and their insureds, the
doctrine of contra proferentem, or interpreting contract ambiguity
73. See First of Georgia Ins. Co. v. Home, 170 S.E.2d 452 (Ga. Ct. App. 1969) (a mere
volunteer cannot recover); Miner v. Farmers Ins. Co., 778 P.2d 778, 780 (Idaho 1989) ("notice to
the insurer that the insured is pursuing an action or settlement that includes the subrogated
interest is necessary before the insured may charge the insurer attorney fees for the collection of
the subrogated interest"); Illinois Auto Ins. Exch. v. Braun, 124 A. 691, 694 (Pa. 1924) (no attor-
ney's fees where plaintiffs "settled the case without the knowledge or acquiescence of' the insur-
er); State Farm Mut. Auto Ins. Co. v. Geline, 179 N.W.2d 815 (Wis. 1970) (notice to insurer
not only that a claim is being asserted or action has been commenced, but also that a reasonable
fee for services rendered in collecting the subrogated interest will be requested, is required before
seeking or securing an attorney's fee from the subrogee insurer).
74. See Mahler, 135 Wash. 2d at 436, 957 P.2d at 652.
75. See, e.g., Findlay v. United Pac. Ins. Co., 129 Wash. 2d 368, 378, 917 P.2d 116, 121
(1996); McMahan & Baker, Inc. v. Continental Cas. Co., 68 Wash. App. 573, 578, 843 P.2d
1133, 1136 (1993). See also KEETON, INSURANCE LAW, supra note 1, § 3.10(a) at 153. "In gen-
eral, the attitude of courts toward subrogation is perhaps best described as one of allowing com-
plete freedom of contract and trying to determine and enforce the expressed intention of the
contracting parties." Id.
1999]
Seattle University Law Review
against the drafter, 76 is traditionally adhered to even more closely
when interpreting insurance policies.77 Yet, the doctrine is typically
used against an insurer in cases where coverage or a duty to defend has
been denied by its insurer, not where the insurer merely insists on
pursuing its own interest according to the policy language as in
Mahler. Thus, contra proferentem is generally justified where the
insured's interests are affected by the discretion of the insurer under
the policy.
78
In Mahler, State Farm provided coverage in the form of PIP
payments. Thus, in exercising its discretion to pursue its interests by
arbitration, State Farm did not affect the interests of its insureds, and
the policies for invoking contra proferentem were not present. Besides
State Farm, only Mahler's and Fisher's attorneys had any real interest
in how this clause was interpreted. Since neither Mahler's nor Fisher's
attorneys were a party to this policy, they should not be able to offer
its meaning against State Farm, contra proferentem.
Instead, the arbitration clause in the policy should be interpreted
according to ordinary contract principles regarding the intents of the
contracting parties. The Washington Supreme Court has repeatedly
held that contract language should not be given a meaning that is
unreasonable. 79 As discussed below, the court's interpretation of the
policy is unreasonable, given the very purpose of subscribing to an
interinsurer arbitration agreement.
The Mahler court may also have been motivated by a desire to
increase access to the judicial system for plaintiffs. The court's hold-
ing does provide a greater incentive for plaintiffs' attorneys to provide
representation to injured plaintiffs, because it enables them to collect a
portion, typically one third, of not only general damages but also spe-
cial damages for doing essentially the same amount of work. How-
ever, whatever social benefits might come from enabling plaintiffs'
attorneys to kill two birds with one stone in this manner is more than
outweighed by the burden to all policyholders of higher premiums.
76. The doctrine of contra proferentem is reflected in the Restatement (Second) of Contracts
§ 206, which provides that "in choosing among the reasonable meanings of a promise or agree-
ment or a term thereof, that meaning is generally preferred which operates against the party who
supplies the words or from whom a writing otherwise proceeds." RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF
CONTRACTS § 206 (1932).
77. See SPENCER L. KIMBALL, CASES AND MATERIALS ON INSURANCE LAW 7 (1992).
78. See id.
79. See Lynott v. National Union Fire Ins. Co., 123 Wash. 2d 678, 689-90, 871 P.2d 146,
152 (1994). "An interpretation of an insurance clause must be reasonable and take into account
the purpose of the insurance at issue." Id.
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III. THE MAHLER COURT'S ANALYSIS OF THE POLICY LANGUAGE
A. Two Independent Contracts
Before discussing the court's analysis of the policy language, it
will help to recall that there are two documents involved in this case:
the policy held by the plaintiffs and the interinsurer arbitration agree-
ment. Both of these are contracts, the former between the plaintiffs
and State Farm and the latter between State Farm and other insurers
that are signatories to the interinsurer arbitration agreement. While
the interinsurer arbitration agreement is referred to in the policies held
by the plaintiffs, it is a completely separate and independent agree-
ment between different parties.
The Mahler court begins its analysis by appealing to the princi-
ples of subrogation, "an equitable doctrine the essential purpose of
which is to provide for a proper allocation of payment responsibility.
[Subrogation] seeks to impose ultimate responsibility for a wrong or
loss on the party who, in equity and good conscience, ought to bear
it."8 However, the court's resolution of the case contradicts this goal,
forcing the insurer of the nonliable party to pay for legal expenses
incurred as a result of the tortfeasor's negligence and misconduct.
The court justifies its decision by scrutinizing the policy lan-
guage involved in these actions as well as the language of the interin-
surer arbitration agreement. 81 Starting with the first paragraph of
80. Mahler v. Szucs, 135 Wash. 2d 398, 411, 957 P.2d 632, 640 (1998) (citing RONALD C.
HORN, SUBROGATION IN INSURANCE THEORY AND PRACTICE 3 (1964)).
81. The hypothetical factual scenario provided in Part I.B., supra, includes the exclusion
clause. However, a greater portion of the policy, discussed by the court, in a section under the
heading, "Our Right to Recover Our Payments," reads as follows:
a. Medical payments, death, dismemberment and loss of sight and total disability
coverage payments are not recoverable by us.
b. Under personal injury protection and underinsured motor vehicle coverages, we
are subrogated to the extent of our payments to the proceeds of any settlement the
injured person recovers from any party liable for the bodily injury or property
damage.
If the person to or for whom we have made payment has not recovered our pay-
ment from the party at fault, he or she shall:
(1) keep these rights in trust for us and do nothing to impair them;
(2) execute any legal papers we need; and
(3) when we ask, take legal action through our representative to recover our
payments.
We are to be repaid our payments, costs, and fees of collection out of any recov-
ery.
c. Under all other coverages the right of recovery of any party we pay passes to us.
Such party shall:
(1) not hurt our rights to recover; and
(2) help us get our money back.
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Paragraph b82 of the policy, the court concludes that because this para-
graph only applies to settlements recovered by an insured, the lan-
guage indicating that State Farm was "subrogated" to the extent of
such settlements clearly contemplates the reservation of a reimburse-
ment interest rather than a subrogation interest.83 Thus, this para-
graph implies, by referring to "settlements," that State Farm did not
intend to "step into the shoes" of its insureds and litigate in court.
Therefore, the first paragraph of Paragraph b 4 contemplates the more
passive role to be played by the insurer, which, as discussed above,
indicates the reservation of a reimbursement interest.
On the other hand, the second paragraph of Paragraph b and
Paragraph c,8" referring to State Farm's ability to "take legal action
through [its] representative to recover [its] payments," creates a tradi-
tional subrogation interest whereby State Farm reserves the right to
"step into the shoes" of its insureds by litigating their rights in court
to recover its own PIP payment interest.86
Given this sensible interpretation of the interests reserved by the
respective clauses of the policy, the court wrongly concludes that the
exception in the second paragraph of Paragraph d87 of the policy, indi-
cating that State Farm need not share the cost of attorney's fees with
its insureds whenever its PIP interest is "recovered or recoverable by
[State Farm] under any interinsurer arbitration agreement," is inappli-
cable. 8 The court reaches this conclusion by infusing into the mean-
ing of the PIP policy a strained reading of the applicable rules under
the interinsurer arbitration agreement. The Personal Injury Protec-
tion Arbitration Agreement Rules and Regulations provide that the
agreement "shall not be construed to create any causes of action or
liabilities not existing in law or equity."89 In light of this restriction,
the court reasons that because State Farm technically only had a cause
d. If the insured recovers from the party at fault and we share in the recovery, we will
pay our share of the legal expenses. Our share is that percent of the legal expenses
that the amount we recover bears to the total recovery. This does not apply to any
amounts recovered or recoverable by us from any other insurer under any inter-
insurer arbitration agreements.
Our right to recover applies only after the insured has been fully compensated for the
bodily injury, property damage or loss.
Mahler, 135 Wash. 2d at 418-19, 957 P.2d at 643 (quoting the State Farm policy language).
82. See id.
83. Id. at 419-20, 957 P.2d at 644.
84. See note 81 supra.
85. See id.
86. Mahler, 135 Wash. 2d at 420-21, 957 P.2d at 644.
87. See note 81 supra.




of action against the respective tortfeasors in these cases, Dr. Szuchs
and Aldi Tire, Inc., and not their insurers, its interests under the PIP
policies were not "recoverable," because to allow State Farm to arbi-
trate these claims with the liability insurer would violate this rule.9 °
This reasoning sharply contradicts both traditional principles of con-
tract law and Washington case law that adopts such principles.
One of the most basic principles of contract interpretation under
the prevailing conception of subjective intent is that the contract
terms, in any case in which both parties agree on one subjective
meaning, are to be given that shared subjective meaning.9 The court
has held that:
[D]etermination of the intent of the contracting parties is to be
accomplished by viewing the contract as a whole, the subject
matter and objective of the contract, all the circumstances sur-
rounding the making of the contract, the subsequent acts and
conduct of the parties to the contract, and the reasonableness of
respective interpretations advocated by the parties.92
The court's rationale for determining that the PIP interests here
are not "recoverable" violates this principle on two fronts: in its
unstated interpretation of the meaning to be given to the arbitration
rules and in its application of that meaning to the terms of the PIP
policy.
First, while the arbitration rules exclude any causes of action or
liabilities an insurer would not have at law, 93 it seems unreasonable to
assume that the signatories to such an arbitration agreement would
intend that this clause would be applicable in this respect. If the sig-
natories had intended for the agreement to have this meaning, the
agreement would have no force or purpose whatsoever in the resolu-
tion of PIP payment interest disputes amongst insurers. State Farm
and the other insurer-signatories would never have signed on to such a
meaningless agreement in the first place! A PIP insurer's legal cause
of action is always limited to a claim against the tortfeasor, but the
insurers that are signatories to the interinsurer arbitration agreement
signed the agreement with the reality in mind that, for all intents and
purposes, insurance companies do indeed have claims against one
90. See id.
91. See generally E. ALLAN FARNSWORTH, CONTRACTS § 7.9 (1990). "The touchstone
of contract interpretation is the parties' intent." Tanner Elec. Co-op v. Puget Sound Power &
Light Co., 128 Wash. 2d 656, 674, 911 P.2d 1301, 1310 (1996).
92. Berg v. Hudesman, 115 Wash. 2d 657, 667, 801 P.2d 222, 228 (1990).
93. See Mahler, 135 Wash. 2d at 423, 957 P.2d at 646.
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another. They are activated contractually by their insureds rather
than by tort law itself, but they are always activated at some point.
A more reasonable interpretation of this provision of the arbitra-
tion rules is that the contracting insurers intended that the arbitration
agreement would not be construed to create any causes of action or
liabilities not existing in law or equity other than those that would
exist between the insurers and/or their corresponding insureds with
whom they are in privity of contract. In other words, as Jeffrey Stem-
pel writes, the lack of a cause of action at law between a liability
insurer and a PIP insurer is "no stumbling block to the use of either
arbitration or appraisal in first party claims, since an obvious contract
exists between insurer and policyholder. . . ." Thus, when the very
purpose of the interinsurer arbitration agreement is considered, the
Mahler court's construction of the rules of the agreement is unreason-
able.
Second, the court wrongly imputes this strained interpretation of
the arbitration agreement rules to the intents of State Farm and its
insureds, the parties to the insurance policy. As noted earlier, an
insurance policy is a contract and should be construed as such.9"
Again, the court should defer to any subjective intent that both insurer
and insured attached to the meaning of the policy. As discussed
above, assuming only that the insurer intended that the arbitration
agreement it signed would serve some purpose, the court should con-
clude that it intended that its PIP interest was "recoverable" against a
liability insurer, even though it was not technically recoverable in a
court of law without the tortfeasor first contractually activating the
duties his insurer owed him.
Likewise, it is unlikely that an insured, like Ms. Mahler or Ms.
Fisher, would be aware of this legal technicality, or that an insured
would attach the meaning that such an interest is not "recoverable"
under the policy terms because State Farm would have no cause of
action at law against another insurer. Therefore, the court's imposi-
tion of this strained interpretation on the intents of the parties to the
insurance policy is also unreasonable.
94. JEFFREY W. STEMPEL, INTERPRETATION OF INSURANCE CONTRACTS § 31.8, 764
(1996); see also KEETON, INSURANCE LAW, supra note 1, § 3.10(a) at 157 (indicating that some
"courts have treated the insurer as the real party in interest and, indeed, as the real party in inter-
est when it has paid the loss in full," and citing Ellis Canning Co. v. International Harvester Co.,
225 P.2d 658 (Kan. 1953), and Shambley v. Jobe-Blackley Plumbing & Heating Co., 142 S.E.2d
18 (N.C. 1965), where insurers were made party plaintiffs as the real parties in interest in tort
actions on behalf of their insureds).
95. See Findlay v. United Pac. Ins. Co., 129 Wash. 2d 368, 378, 917 P.2d 116,121 (1996).
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Having delivered its argument on the supposed inapplicability of
the exception for payment of attorney's fees in the policy, the court,
"assuming arguendo State Farm does have a claim against the tort-fea-
sor's insurers that makes its PIP payments 'recoverable,"' wrongly
determines that State Farm had nothing to recover in any case.96 It
reaches this conclusion, again, by disregarding applicable contract
principles and by ignoring the fact that the arbitration process is com-
pletely separate from and independent of any judicial proceeding.
The court begins by reiterating that because Mahler and Fisher
decided to actively litigate their claims against the liability insurers,
"State Farm had only a right of reimbursement from its insureds from
the proceeds of the settlements" and "State Farm had to await the out-
come of the settlement process before attempting any recovery from
the tortfeasors' insurers."97  Reciting the rule in Thiringer that pre-
cludes a PIP insurer from recovering any of its payments until its
insured is fully compensated, the court concludes that "there was
nothing left for State Farm to recover," since Mahler and Fisher had
already recovered the PIP interests.98 This reasoning ignores both
State Farm's swift instruction to its insureds that it intended to pursue
its interests on its own and the fact that the arbitration process is inde-
pendent of claims pending in court.99 In effect, the court allows the
insureds to ignore any express wishes of the insurer regarding the
means by which it will pursue its own interest.
Again, as soon as State Farm learned that Mahler had hired her
own attorney, it gave express notice that it intended to recover its PIP
payments by means of the interinsurer arbitration agreement, and it
advised her attorney that he should do nothing to recover that inter-
est.1"' By ignoring this instruction, Mahler's attorney was not moti-
vated by the best interests of his client, for Ms. Mahler had already
been fully compensated for her medical expenses directly from State
Farm. Rather, he was motivated by the fact that if he recovered it, he
would be able to take one third of that additional interest for himself,
but without having any additional work. The court should not reward
Mahler's attorney for flatly disregarding that instruction for no one's
benefit but his own.
96. Mahler v. Szucs, 135 Wash. 2d 398, 423-24, 957 P.2d 632, 646 (1998).
97. Id. at 424, 957 P.2d at 646.
98. Id.
99. See supra Section III.A for a discussion of the terms of the interinsurer arbitration
agreement, which, contrary to the court's underlying assumptions here, indicate that the arbitra-
tion process is independent in that it does not rely on any in-court adjudicatory proceeding.
100. Mahler, 135 Wash. 2d at 406, 957 P.2d at 637.
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Similarly, in Fisher's case, State Farm had not been notified that
its insured intended to litigate special damages until the brink of set-
tlement, but it gave a similar notice as soon as it was notified. 1 '
Fisher's attorney should have given notice as soon as he began repre-
senting Ms. Fisher so that State Farm could decide whether or not to
invoke interinsurer arbitration. Again, Ms. Fisher had already been
compensated for her medical expenses directly from State Farm, and
she had sought counsel only in hopes of obtaining general damages.
Therefore, her attorney, like Ms. Mahler's, was motivated not by his
client's interests but by his own.
Furthermore, the arbitration proceeding is independent of any
judicial proceeding, as is reflected in the rules of the arbitration
agreement that the Mahler court relies on so extensively, which pro-
vide that "[a] finding as to the amount of damages at issue shall be
based upon the facts presented to the arbitrators."' 2 Again, although
the existence of rights and duties in tort law between an insured and a
tortfeasor activates a contractual relationship between liability and PIP
insurers, as the above clause plainly indicates, that relationship is not
governed by what occurs in court between the insured and the tortfea-
sor. Thus, the arbitration agreement is independent of any dispute
over injuries between the insured and the liability insurer in court, and
it will not affect the insured's right under Thiringer to be fully com-
pensated for those injuries by adjudicating her claim in court.
B. One Body of Evidence Establishing Two Types of Damages
Next, the Mahler court addresses various public policy argu-
ments. First, it accurately states State Farm's position that "injured
plaintiffs [should be required to] refrain from seeking recovery from
defendants for PIP benefit payments simply because State Farm might
elect to recover those payments on its own.' 3 However, it incorrectly
concludes that such a rule would result in "reduced general damage
awards by juries," asserting that "[ilnjured plaintiffs should be able to
introduce all relevant evidence to support their general damages
claim. ,104
The court misinterprets the position opted for by State Farm by
erroneously assuming that insurers mean to preclude plaintiffs' attor-
neys from introducing any relevant evidence whatsoever to prove the
101. See id. at 408-09, 957 P.2d at 638-39. See also supra note 21.
102. ARBITRATION FORUMS, INC., PERSONAL INJURY PROTECTION (No-FAULT)
ARBITRATION AGREEMENT RULES AND REGULATIONS, 1/96 PIP (1991) (standardized form).




general damages incurred by their clients. Indeed, plaintiffs will usu-
ally need to introduce documentary evidence of special damages in
order to prove general damages. However, as discussed earlier, the
fact that such proof substantiates special damages is incidental to the
attorney's purpose of obtaining a general damage award for his client.
After all, in most cases the client who is insured under a PIP policy
does not seek representation to recover special damages, because those
have already been covered by the PIP insurer.
Plaintiffs' attorneys should, rather, be required to treat proof
establishing special damages that they incidentally provide as they
would any other evidence establishing general damages, and they
should be precluded from recovering such an incidentally proven
claim on the insurer's behalf. Or, if an attorney does use such evi-
dence as proof of special damages and then in fact collects the special
damages proven, she should be required to turn over those special
damages, insofar as they amount to PIP payments, to the PIP insurer
without deducting any fees, assuming, of course, that the PIP insurer
did not authorize the attorney to represent it. This rule would dis-
courage abuse of PIP insurers' financial resources by plaintiffs' attor-
neys and preserve the principle of free choice.
C. A Forced Attorney/Client Relationship and
Misapplication of the Common Fund Doctrine
The Mahler court further rejects the argument by State Farm
that it should not be required to pay part of Mahler's and Fisher's
attorney's fees, because it had no consensual attorney/client relation-
ship with either Mahler's or Fisher's attorneys." 5 It bases this
conclusion on the common fund doctrine, 10 6 ultimately demanding
that "if State Farm wishes to receive the benefit of the funds Mahler
and Fisher recovered, it must share the expenses of recovering those
funds.'
An examination of the case law reveals that the common fund
doctrine is clearly not applicable to this case, and the court demon-
strates its misapplication by its characterization of State Farm as "the
benefited party," whose consent is not required under the doctrine.'08
105. Id. at 427, 957 P.2d at 648.
106. The common fund doctrine is an equitable doctrine under which the court awards
attorney's fees to litigants who "preserve or create a common fund for the benefit of others as
well as themselves." Covell v. City of Seattle, 127 Wash. 2d 874, 891, 905 P.2d 324, 333 (1995).
107. Mahler, 135 Wash. 2d at 427, 957 P.2d at 648.
108. Id.
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The court cites Covell v. City of Seattle as supportive of its
proposition that this is a common fund case." 9 Covell, however, was a
class-action case where a group of taxpayers opposed a city ordinance
imposing a residential street utility charge as unconstitutional."' In
Covell, the court awarded attorney's fees to the prevailing class,
because the plaintiffs had "created a specific monetary fund and con-
ferred a substantial benefit on an ascertainable class.""' Similarly, all
of the cases cited by the court in Covell in its decision to invoke the
common fund doctrine involve class-action plaintiffs."' In Covell, the
court observes that "[w]hen attorney fees are available to prevailing
class action plaintiffs, plaintiffs will have less difficulty obtaining
counsel and greater access to the judicial system. Little good comes
from a system where justice is available only to those who can afford
its price. ' ' .
These policy considerations, which the Covell court deemed
merit application of the common fund doctrine, are simply not present
in Mahler. Because Mahler involves subrogation and its vicarious
relationships, it is unclear whether the court meant to analogize the
plaintiffs in Covell to State Farm or to the plaintiffs, Mahler and
Fisher.
In any case, considering the parties and the resources available to
them, neither of these alternatives is a fair comparison that justifies
invoking the doctrine. Mahler and Fisher each had access to the judi-
cial system, as they had each retained attorneys who had acquired
significant general damages awards to compensate them for their
losses. Likewise, State Farm, an insurance company with innumerable
attorneys at its disposal, unquestionably had access to the judicial
system. More importantly, however, State Farm did not desire to
have access to the judicial system, and had subscribed to an arbitration
process that would enable it to reduce its dependency on the judicial
system for resolution of disputes with other insurers. As noted earlier,
the inevitable increase in the price of premiums surely outweighs any
greater access to the judicial system that this award of attorney's fees
might inspire.
With such less expensive options available, the nonconsensual
relationship that was imposed on State Farm in no way benefited it.
109. Id. at 427-28, 957 P.2d at 647.
110. 127 Wash. 2d 874, 905 P.2d 324 (1995).
111. Id. at 892, 905 P.2d at 333.
112. Id. at 891-92, 905 P.2d at 333 (citing Bowles v. Department of Retirement Systems,
121 Wash. 2d 52, 70-71, 847 P.2d 440, 449-50 (1993); Public Utility Dist. 1 v. Kottsick, 86
Wash. 2d 388, 390, 545 P.2d 1, 3 (1976)).
113. Id. (citing Bowles, 121 Wash. 2d at 70-71, 847 P.2d at 449-50).
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Indeed, the benefit the court supposes State Farm received actually
caused it to lose one third of its PIP interest. Thus, the court is
incorrect in concluding that a consensual attorney/client relationship
is not required between State Farm and Mahler's and Fisher's attor-
neys.
The court itself illustrates the intuitive fallacy of its argument
when it counters State Farm's assertion that the attorneys did not truly
recover medical expenses, declaring that "State Farm has no standing
to complain about fee agreements it is not a party to."' 1 4 Having
established that State Farm is not a "benefited party" as the court
posits, since imposition of this relationship has cost it one third of its
PIP interest, State Farm is nevertheless suppressed from even con-
testing the terms of the agreement to which it is fettered. With this
result's inherent unfairness, the court does not attain the lofty goals of
the equitable doctrine of subrogation it initially set out to reach.
Finally, the court also rejects State Farm's contention that this
forced relationship can create a conflict of interests if the attorney,
acting principally out of his own and his client's interests to maximize
the total settlement amount, were to compromise the insurer's interest
in maximizing the recovery of its PIP interest."' Indeed, this argu-
ment is sound and meritorious, and the court dismisses it not on the
basis of any flaw, but rather as a second corollary of its misapplication
of the common fund doctrine to this case. 116 However, its mistaken
application of the doctrine leads the court to a conclusion blatantly at
odds with the holdings in Metropolitan Life, Thiringer, and Leader
National, which, as discussed earlier, imply that whenever an insured
enters a settlement agreement, special damages must be separated
from general damages so as not to prejudice the insurer's interests."
7
In opposition to this idea, the Mahler court, holding steady to its
position that there is no conflict of interests here, states that
[i]t makes no difference how State Farm's insureds may choose
to segregate and label their recovery from the tortfeasor into
general damages and special damages (something a typical plain-
tiff has no interest in doing anyway)--the amount State Farm is
entitled to by means of subrogation is based solely on what
benefits it paid out."8
114. Mahler, 135 Wash. 2d at 429, 957 P.2d at 649.
115. Id. at 427-28, 957 P.2d at 648.
116. Seeid.
117. See supra Section II.DA for a discussion of how these three cases implicitly call for
separation of special damages from general damages.
118. Mahler, 135 Wash. 2d at 428, 957 P.2d at 648.
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Perhaps Ms. Mahler and Ms. Fisher have no interest in segre-
gating these amounts, but State Farm surely does. Otherwise, how
can an insurer or a court know whether or not the insurer's reim-
bursement interest has been prejudiced by a settlement agreement?
Without some documentation of the extent to which an insured's set-
tlement recovery represents either general or special damages, an
insurer can never effectively seek to protect its reimbursement interest
from prejudice imposed by the insured, as Metropolitan Life entitles
the PIP insurer to do,119 or from prejudice imposed by the liability
insurer, as Leader National entitles the PIP insurer to do. 2 '
The effect of the Mahler court's misapplication of the common
fund doctrine, then, is to completely disregard the importance of pre-
serving the PIP insurer's reimbursement interest, as it provides the
PIP insurer virtually no means of protecting that interest. Thus, while
the court fails to discuss the practical significance of its decision, it
has, in reality, completely abrogated the underlying guarantees to
insurers apparent in its earlier decisions.
IV. CONCLUSION
Although many premium payers typically hold some resentment
toward their insurers, an understanding of insurance as a system of
risk management reveals that in order for the system to best serve its
insureds as an effective institution, it must be free to pursue its inter-
ests in the most efficient fashion. As Spencer Kimball relates, "By the
nature of their business, healthy insurers have a copious cash flow and
therefore tend to be perceived erroneously as money trees, rather than
in their true nature as conduits by which money is transferred from a
large class of premium payers to a smaller class of claimants.'
' 21
While claimants must have their day, reducing the transactional costs
of settling claimants' awards will benefit that larger and equally
important class, the premium-paying public.
Allowing plaintiffs' attorneys to collect attorneys' fees for recov-
ering an insurer's PIP interest against that insurer's will is inefficient
and a detriment to premium-payers. Awarding such fees might mar-
ginally facilitate the securing of representation for some plaintiffs by
allowing attorneys to take a portion of both general and special dam-
ages after doing the same amount of work, effectively enabling them to
kill two birds with one stone. However, any such benefit is counter-
balanced by the enormous burden on premium-payers, who will ulti-
119. See supra Section II.D.1 for a discussion of the holdings of this case.
120. See supra Section II.D.1 for a discussion of this case.
121. SPENCER L. KIMBALL, CASES AND MATERIALS ON INSURANCE LAW 7 (1992).
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mately subsidize this windfall to the plaintiffs' bar if the Washington
courts continue to apply the rule of Mahler.122
122. Divisions II and III of the Washington Court of Appeals have upheld the rule
regarding attorney's fees articulated in Mahler. See Peterson v. Safeco Ins. Co. of Illinois, 96
Wash. App. 254, 976 P.2d 632 (1999); Deturk v. State Farm Auto. Ins. Co., 94 Wash. App.
364, 967 P.2d 994 (Wash. App. 1998). See also Harwood v. Group Health Northwest, 93 Wash.
App. 569, 970 P.2d 760 (1999) (applying the reasoning of Mahler to the recovery of a health
insurer's subrogation interest.) In Harwood, Division III further extended the holding of Mahler
such that it no longer even requires the plaintiff to show that the insurer was ostensibly a "bene-
fited party":
[T]he better rule is that if an insurance company contracts with an insured to have a
subrogation right to any recovery the insured makes against a third party, and that
contract included language requiring the insurer to share the expense of recovery, the
insurer should have to help pay attorney fees for the legal work done to make that
recovery. No benefit to the insurer needs to be shown.
Id. at 576, 970 P.2d at 764.
